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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines mortgage delinquency rates for loans in each state and Washington, DC 
from 2004 through 2009 in order to gain insight into the key factors that drive residential 
mortgage delinquency.  Models are estimated for 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, 90+ day, and all 
delinquency rates.  Prime and subprime loans are modeled separately in cross-sectional time 
series regressions.  The findings suggest that borrower income, type of loan, and the general 
health of the economy remain important in determining delinquency risk.  Also, factors that 
determine 30- and 60-day delinquency rates differ from those that determine 90-day and 90+ day 
delinquency rates.  In addition, factors that determine prime delinquency rates differ from those 
that determine subprime delinquency rates.  Finally, borrower race does not consistently explain 
delinquency rates.       
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he issue of what drives default is at the core of residential mortgage default literature.  Studies of 
mortgage default usually consider the completion of the foreclosure process.  However, there are 
many steps between the time a borrower stops making payments and foreclosure.  At each scheduled 
payment date, a borrower can choose to make the mortgage payment, delay payment, stop payments completely, or 
pay the balance of the loan through refinancing or sale of the property.  A borrower is considered to be delinquent 
on his mortgage when one payment has been completely missed and a second payment is due.  Once a borrower 
misses three or more payments, he is considered to have defaulted.  Lenders may then proceed with foreclosure.   
 
When scheduled payments are not made, lenders cannot know whether borrowers are only delaying 
mortgage payments temporarily or stopping mortgage payments altogether.  Borrowers may choose to become 
delinquent on a mortgage to address cash flow problems resulting from a decline in income or an increase in 
expenses.  Delinquency is costly to both borrowers and lenders.  For borrowers, delinquency costs include penalty 
fees and a lower credit rating.  For lenders, slow loans may be almost as costly as loans that reach foreclosure.  
Moreover, a loan must necessarily be delinquent prior to foreclosure.  Therefore, identifying the factors that drive 
delinquency and the transition from delinquency to foreclosure is important.   
 
This paper examines mortgage delinquency rates for loans in each state and Washington, DC from 2004 
through 2009, a period characterized by sharp increases in borrower delinquency.  The models incorporate 
information available to mortgage providers from the loan application about the borrower and the type of loan, as 
well as variables that capture economic conditions and shocks to income.  The analysis provides information that 
will allow mortgage providers to improve assessments during underwriting and mortgage servicers to implement 
strategies that improve the default resolution process.  The paper proceeds as follows.  In the second section, we 
discuss determinants of mortgage delinquency.  In the third section, we formulate an econometric model of 
mortgage delinquency rates.  In the fourth section, we present data on mortgage delinquency rates across the US.  In 
the fifth section, we present our empirical analysis.  Our conclusions are presented in the sixth section. 
 
 
 
T 
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DETERMINANTS OF MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY 
  
Most residential mortgage default studies focus on providing insight to the foreclosure risk of mortgages.  
There are relatively few studies on mortgage delinquency.  Early studies of mortgage delinquency include Herzog 
and Earley (1970), von Furstenberg and Green (1974), Morton (1975) and Campbell and Dietrich (1983).  These 
studies examine the relationship between delinquency and various loan and borrower characteristics.   
 
 Herzog and Earley (1970) find that loan-to-value ratio and the presence of junior financing have a positive 
effect on delinquency.  Income stability, measured by type of occupation, significantly reduces delinquency.   The 
term of the loan and payment-to-income ratio are found to have no affect on delinquency.   
 
 von Furstenberg and Green (1974) find loan-to-value ratio and the presence of junior financing to have a 
positive effect on delinquency.  The authors also find an age pattern to delinquency.  Delinquency rates increase 
after origination, peaking at about the fourth year, and then fall to about one-third of their initial level by the 
fifteenth year.  Income is found to be negatively related to delinquency.   
 
 Morton (1975) argues that a majority of delinquencies are cured and shows that variables capturing home 
equity and a borrower’s ability to pay are less systematically related to delinquency than to default.   
 
 Campbell and Dietrich (1983) consider possible borrower action at each point in time.  Borrowers are 
assumed to select the action that yields the highest utility.  In this framework, the authors compare the determinants 
of delinquency and default rates.  The authors find that household income and interest rates are more influential than 
home equity in explaining delinquency.  While they expected loan-to-value ratio to be less important for 
delinquency than for default, their results show that loan-to-value ratio positively affects both delinquency and 
default.   The unemployment rate is shown to have a significant positive effect on delinquency and default rates. 
 
 Another approach to analyzing residential mortgage delinquency considers the impact of income and 
expense shocks on borrowers’ decisions to delay mortgage payments.  Webb (1982) examines potential delinquency 
using increases in mortgage payment-to-income ratio over time as a proxy.  He finds that households headed by 
minorities or persons in occupations with high income variability are more likely to become delinquent.  Also, 
mortgages with a high degree of variability in payments are more likely to become delinquent.  The findings also 
suggest that high risk borrowers are consistently more likely to become delinquent than other borrowers, regardless 
of the variability in mortgage payments. 
 
 Later studies of mortgage delinquency and default extend the work of Campbell and Dietrich (1983) by 
analyzing mortgage delinquency and default as separate outcomes.  These studies include Ambrose and Capone 
(1998), Capozza and Thomson (2005), Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005), and Capozza and Thomson (2006). 
 
 Ambrose and Capone (1998) track the ultimate resolution of a sample of FHA loans that are at least three 
months delinquent.  The authors find that models that separate loans by their expected equity position at default are 
statistically different.  These differences are attributed to “ruthless” versus “trigger event” defaulters.  Ruthless 
defaulters increase their wealth by defaulting on a mortgage when there is negative equity in the property.  Such 
defaults are termed ruthless in the sense that borrowers have the ability to pay but choose not to do so.  Trigger event 
defaulters foreclose on their properties even though there is positive equity.  In this case, the amount of equity does 
not exceed the cost of selling and the household does not have the liquid assets to make up the difference upon sale.  
These liquidity-constrained borrowers often have difficulties that arise from events such as job loss, illness, death, 
divorce, or jumps in mortgage payments because of interest rate resets on adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs).  The 
authors argue that subprime borrowers are more likely to be trigger event defaulters.   
 
Capozza and Thomson (2005) provide evidence that subprime mortgage loans behave differently from 
prime loans.  Subprime loans default earlier and the losses are larger than for prime loans. 
 
 Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) examine the implications of delinquency on the performance of 30-
year, fixed rate subprime mortgages.  They find that loans that are very delinquent prepay while those with negative 
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equity default.  The authors also find that credit scores are negatively related to delinquency and default.  
Unemployment rates are found to have no impact on delinquency or default rates.   
 
 Capozza and Thomson (2006) find that subprime lenders delay foreclosure proceedings for borrowers with 
weaker credit ratings and loans with higher interest rate premiums.  Subprime loans that become seriously 
delinquent are about twice as likely as prime loans to foreclose, but they take four times longer to get there.  Loans 
with shorter delinquency periods are more likely to cure.   
 
 In general, much of the research on the factors that drive mortgage delinquency is conducted on individual 
loans held in portfolios.  Drawing from this literature, we model mortgage delinquency rates for loans in each state 
and Washington, DC for the period 2004 through 2009 using variables that can be classified into the following three 
categories:  1) borrower characteristics; 2) loan characteristics; and 3) economic conditions and shocks to income.  
The affect these variables have on delinquency rates is estimated in cross-sectional time-series regressions.  Prime 
and subprime loans are modeled separately to capture differences in the performance of these loans.   
 
MODEL OF US MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY RATES 
  
We use a two-way fixed effects model to examine cross-sectional time series data on mortgage delinquency 
rates in the US.  Our data consists of delinquency rates for all fifty states and Washington, DC for the period 2004 
through 2009.  Therefore, there are fifty-one cross-sectional observations and six time series observations.  Greene 
(2003) expresses the two-way fixed effects model as follows:  
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where ity  is the dependent variable, k  represents the slope coefficients that are common to all cross-sections, itx  
are the explanatory variables, i s are nonrandom parameters capturing the unobserved cross-sectional effects, t s 
are nonrandom parameters capturing the unobserved time effects, and ite  are the residuals which are independent 
and identically distributed random variables with   0iteE  and   22 eiteE  .   
  
Since the dataset is balanced, we can write the following: 
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where the symbols:  
 
ity  and itx  are the dependent variable (a scalar) and the explanatory variables (a vector whose columns are the 
independent variables not including a constant), respectively. 
.iy and .ix  are cross section means.  
ty  and tx  are time means.  

y and 

x  are the overall means.   
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 The two-way fixed effects model is simply a regression of ity
~
 on itx
~
.  Therefore, the two-way   is given 
by: 
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 The calculations of cross section dummy variables, time dummy variables, and intercepts follows.  Denote 
the cross-sectional effects by   and the time effects by  .  These effects are calculated from the following 
relations: 
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Denote the cross-sectional dummy variables and time dummy variables with the superscript C and T.  
When no intercept is specified, the dummy equations can be written as follows: 
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The sum of squared errors is: 
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The estimated error variance can be written: 
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The variance covariance matrix of S is given by 
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The variance covariance matrix of the dummy variables is specified as follows: 
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DATA 
 
 The data on delinquency rates are from the Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey 
and are for the period 2004 through 2009.  Figure 1 shows delinquency rates for all prime loans and those that are 
categorized as 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, and seriously delinquent (90+ day).  During the sample period, delinquency 
rates for prime loans increased from 2.4 percent to 5.6 percent - a 130 percent increase.  The largest increase 
occurred between 2008 and 2009.  This rapid one-year increase in delinquency rates was driven by loans that were 
90-day and seriously delinquent.    
 
Figure 1:  Delinquency Rates for Prime Mortgage Loans 
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 Figure 2 shows delinquency rates for all subprime loans and those that are categorized as 30-day, 60-day, 
90-day, and seriously delinquent.  During the sample period, delinquency rates for subprime loans are four to five 
times those for prime loans.  Subprime delinquency rates increased from 11.0 percent in 2004 to 24.6 percent in 
2009 - a 124 percent increase.  Large increases in delinquency rates occurred during the periods 2006-2007 and 
2008-2009 and were driven by loans that were 90-day and seriously delinquent.  
 
Figure 2:  Delinquency Rates for Subprime Mortgage Loans 
 
 
The explanatory variables used to estimate delinquency rates for each state and the proposed direction of 
influence are provided in Table 1.  A trend analysis for each independent variable is provided in the paragraphs that 
follow.   
 
Table 1:  Dependent Variable, Delinquency Rate 
Independent Variables Category Direction of Influence 
 Borrower  Characteristics Direct (+) Inverse  (-) 
whpct, blpct, hispct, asnpct, & ntvpct borrowers by race (%) X X 
fempct female borrowers (%) X  
credscr credit score (#) 
 
X 
income personal income (current $) 
 
X 
 Loan Characteristics 
  nonoccpt non-owner occupied loans (%) X 
 nivst no-income verification loans (%) X 
 spread loans with a reportable rate spread at origination (%) X 
pctrefi refinance loans (%)  X 
lien2nd loans with subordinate liens (%) X  
pctadj adjustable rate loans (%) X 
  Economic Conditions and Shocks to Income 
  denpct denial rate (%) 
 
X 
unempl unemployment rate (%) X 
 numpermt number of building permits (#)  X 
hpidx house price index (thousands $)  X 
probusvc 
growth rate of persons employed in professional and 
business services (%)  X 
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PDUEALLS 10.97% 12.52% 13.88% 17.72% 19.04% 24.60%
PDUE30S 6.23% 6.89% 7.75% 8.80% 8.61% 8.56%
PDUE60S 1.95% 2.35% 2.84% 3.78% 4.08% 4.55%
PDUE90S 2.78% 3.28% 3.28% 5.15% 6.35% 11.50%
SDLQS 6.87% 6.76% 7.91% 12.65% 16.12% 23.65%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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Borrower Characteristics 
 
 Figure 3 captures race of the borrower in percent.  Whpct, blpct, hispct, asnspct and ntvpct are the percent 
of white borrowers, African American borrowers, Hispanic borrowers, Asian borrowers, and Native American 
borrowers, respectively.  The base category is “other”.  In general, loans to white borrowers are greater than 75 
percent.  These loans peaked in 2009 at 81.4 percent.  African American borrowers’ percent share of loans peaked in 
2006 at 7.7 percent and steadily declined each year to 2.4 percent in 2009.  Hispanic borrowers’ percent share of 
loans also peaked in 2007 at 6.9 percent and declined to 2.9 percent in 2009.  Asians’ percent share ranged from 3.0 
to 4.1 percent, peaking in 2009.  Native Americans’ percent share, in general, is less than one percent and ranged 
from 0.4 to 0.6 percent, peaking in 2004.  The impact of borrower race on delinquency is expected to vary across 
race.  Borrower race does not imply, for example, that being Hispanic will increase delinquency, but captures 
unobserved factors unique to being Hispanic that may influence delinquency.  In some cases, minorities experience 
greater variation in income.  This is expected to increase delinquency risk. 
 
 Figure 4 captures the percent of female borrowers - fempct.  In view of the disparity in income between 
males and females, referred to as the "gender gap in earnings", it is assumed that females’ ability to pay is impaired 
by the gap.  As a result, being a female borrower should increase mortgage delinquency.  The percent share of 
female borrowers has increased over time ranging from 6.9 to 7.3 percent.   
 
 Figure 5 captures credit score - credscr.   Credit score is computed as a numerical expression based on a 
statistical analysis of a person's credit files. A credit score represents the creditworthiness of that person.  Higher 
credit scores signify lower credit risk, and in turn, lower delinquencies.  On average, the credit score for the United 
States was 678 in 2004, 677 in 2005, 676 in 2006, 692 in 2007, 683 in 2008 and 696 in 2009.  The credit score data 
suggests that the overall trend in borrowers’ creditworthiness has improved over time.   
 
 Figure 6 captures personal income in current dollars - income.  Personal income includes earnings received 
from all sources, including rental income, dividend income, interest income, and transfer receipts.  On average, 
personal income has increased steadily from 2004 to 2008 ranging from $32,336 to $39,609.  In 2009, personal 
income declined by 2.1 percent.  It is assumed that individuals with higher incomes have fewer delinquencies. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Percent of Loans by Race 
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Figure 4:  Percent of Loans by Females 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Average Credit Score 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Personal Income 
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Loan Characteristics 
 
 Figure 7 captures the percent of loans where the borrower does not occupy the home - nonoccpt.  Owner 
occupants are considered less risky and command the best terms, other things being equal. Non-owner occupants are 
considered to be real estate investors. Higher percentages of non-owner occupancy increase the chance of investor 
loan speculation and rental vacancy risk.   This increases credit risk and delinquency.  The percentage of non-owner 
occupant loans peaked in 2008 at 14.8 percent and declined to 9.2 percent in 2009.   
 
 Figure 8 captures the percent of loans in which income is not reported - nivst. While HMDA (Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act) rules make no specific reference to NIV (No-Income Verification) applications per se, the 
NIV characteristic can be implicitly derived from the absence of a reported value in the income field.  It is also 
assumed that NIV loans do not use income in the underwriting decision.  The higher the percentage of NIV loans, 
then the higher the percentage of borrowers that may have insufficient income to support loan repayment, thereby 
increasing credit risk and delinquency.  The percent of NIV loans peaked in 2006 and has declined since that time.  
There was a sharp decrease of 23.0 percent between 2007 and 2008. 
 
 Figure 9 captures the percent of loans with a spread at origination - spread.  The spread is reported in 
HMDA if the difference between the annual percentage rate (APR) and the applicable Treasury yield is greater than 
or equal to 3 percentage points for first-lien loans or 5 percentage points for subordinate loans.  A loan with a high 
spread indicates that the lender perceives the borrower has above-average risk.  Therefore, loans with spreads are 
expected to have greater risk of delinquency.  Between 2004 and 2005, the percent of loans with a spread increased 
by 64.8 percent.  In 2006, loans with spreads peaked and then steadily declined by 36.9 percent, 40.8 percent, and 
70.9 percent in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively.   
 
 Figure 10 captures the percent of loans originated for refinancing a housing unit - pctrefi.  The share of 
loans for refinancing declined in 2005 and 2006 by 10.2 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively.  The refinance 
percentage increased sharply, by 72.0 percent, 15.2 percent, and 35.8 percent in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively.  
It is assumed that the ability to refinance, particularly out of a bad loan, will decrease delinquency.  Also, it is 
assumed that borrowers that refinance mortgage loans have more experience handling mortgage payments.  This 
should also reduce risk of delinquency. 
 
 Figure 11 captures the percent of loans originated that are secured by a subordinate lien on the dwelling - 
lien2nd.  Loans with subordinate liens are riskier for lenders and generally come with less favorable terms than first 
mortgages.  In addition, secondary financing suggests that the loan-to-value ratio may be understated.  This should 
increase risk of delinquency.  The share of loans with second liens peaked in 2006 and declined dramatically since 
then.  The percent of loans with second liens fell by 27.9 percent, 51.5 percent and 80.1 percent in 2007, 2008, and 
2009, respectively.  
 
 Figure 12 captures the percent of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) - pctadj. Adjustable rate mortgages 
have interest rate changes based on a standard rate index.  Most ARMs have a cap on how much the interest rate 
may increase. The higher the percentage of ARMs, the greater the number of borrowers that are exposed to payment 
shocks.  This increases credit risk and leads to higher delinquencies.  Between 2004 and 2005, the percent of 
adjustable rate mortgages increased by 16.5 percent.  The share of ARMs peaked at 17.3 percent in 2006 and 
declined by 3.6 percent, 9.3 percent, and 17.4 percent in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. 
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Figure 7:  Percent of Non-occupancy Loans 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Percent of Loans with No-income Verification 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Percent of Loans with a Spread 
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Figure 10: Percent of Refinanced Loans 
 
 
Figure 11:  Percent of Loans with a Second Lien 
 
 
Figure 12:  Percent of Adjustable Rate Loans 
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for prime and subprime lenders. Subprime lenders attract many applications from less creditworthy individuals 
resulting in high denial rates.  To the extent that this variable includes subprime activity, it may not have the inverse 
relationship on delinquency as expected. A direct relationship could exist because borrowers are finding it more 
difficult to obtain mortgage financing.  In general, the percent of applications denied can serve as an indicator of the 
availability of mortgage credit, which is critical to a well functioning housing market.  In 2007, the share of 
applications denied peaked at 24.7 percent.  Denials experienced a sharp 19 percent decline in 2008 followed by a 
modest 3.2 percent decline the following year.  
 
 Figure 14 captures the unemployment rate - unempl.  The unemployment rate declined between 2004 and 
2007, then increased by 22 percent in 2008 and 58 percent in 2009.  Unemployment results in shocks to income that 
impact a borrower’s ability to pay a mortgage.  Therefore, unemployment rate and mortgage delinquency should be 
directly related.   
 
 Figure 15 captures the number of construction building permits which represent the number of new 
privately-owned housing units authorized to be built in the United States - numpermt.  The number of building 
permits provides a general indication of the amount of new housing stock that has been added to the housing 
inventory.  Since not all permits become actual housing starts and starts lag the permit stage of construction, these 
numbers do not represent total new construction, but should provide a general indicator of construction activity.  
Housing permits are issued in larger quantities when the housing market is expected to be strong.  If a trigger event 
occurs, a borrower’s ability to sell or refinance is likely to be better in a strong housing market.  This should reduce 
the risk of delinquency.  The number of permits peaked in 2005 and has progressively declined.  The largest decline 
in permits - 41 percent - occurred in 2008.  This downward trend in construction activity served as a barometer that 
the economy started to move into a recession.  
 
 Figure 16 captures the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index - hpidx.  This index 
provides a measure of typical price inflation for houses within the US.  Increases in house prices improve the 
borrower’s equity position, which in turn reduces delinquency risk because homeowners are in a better position to 
refinance or sell if a trigger event occurs.  Nationally, house prices peaked in 2007 and declined by 3.3 percent and 
4.6 percent in 2008 and 2009, respectively.  
 
 Figure 17 captures the growth rate for individuals employed in professional and business services - 
probusvc. It is assumed that these employees are highly trained, have higher income levels, and lower income 
variation.  In the event of job loss, these individuals are likely to find employment more readily.  This should reduce 
the impact of shocks to income and the risk of delinquency.  The growth rate for professional and business services 
employment increased by 204.5 percent between 2004 and 2005 and peaked in 2006.  Since 2006, it has declined by 
24.1 percent, 34.3 percent, and 290.9 percent in 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.   
 
Figure 13:  Percent of Applications Denied 
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Figure 14:  Unemployment Rate 
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Figure 17:  Employment Growth Rate for Professional and Business Services 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
  
Our review of the results focuses on identifying factors that explain delinquency rates for prime and 
subprime loans.  For each type of loan, models are estimated for 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, seriously delinquent (90+ 
day), and all loans using independent variables that represent:  1) borrower characteristics; 2) loan characteristics; 
and 3) economic conditions and shocks to income. 
 
 Table 2 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 30-day delinquency rates.  For both models, 
R
2
 exceeds 0.98.  The variable that significantly explains 30-day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime 
loans and exhibits the expected direction of influence is house price index (economic condition).  For prime loans, 
the percent of NIV loans and the percent of refinance loans (loan characteristics) significantly explain 30-day 
delinquency rates.  For subprime loans, income (borrower characteristic), percent of non-owner occupied loans, 
percent of NIV loans, and the percent of refinance loans (loan characteristics) and number of housing permits issued 
(economic condition) significantly explain 30-day delinquency rates.  The regression results suggest the following: 
 
 30-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans.  
NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments.  
These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk.  Therefore, the 
regression results seem reasonable. 
 30-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of refinance loans increases for prime and subprime loans.  
This relationship may signify that borrowers who are experienced with mortgage payments may choose to 
stop making payments temporarily to smooth consumption.  Therefore, we would expect to see a positive 
relationship between percent of refinance loans and 30-day and 60-day delinquency rates and a negative 
relationship between 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates because foreclosure filings may proceed after 
the third payment is missed.  Our findings are consistent with this expectation. 
 For subprime loans, 30-day delinquency rates increase with borrower income.  This relationship may 
signify that high income borrowers may choose to stop making payments temporarily to smooth 
consumption.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable because there is a positive relationship 
between income and 30-day delinquency rates and no relationship between 60-day, 90-day, and 90+ day 
delinquency rates.  
 For subprime loans, 30-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of non-owner occupied loans 
increases.  This result may signify that these borrowers view credit impairment that results from skipping 
mortgage payments to be too costly.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  
 For subprime loans, 30-day delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increase.  This 
result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices.  This is consistent 
with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by 
dramatic declines in house prices.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
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Table 2:  30-day Delinquency Rates 
 Prime, 30 Days  Subprime, 30 Days  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
whpct -0.0099 -1.1800  -0.0074 -0.3900  
blpct -0.0010 -0.1800  0.0038 0.2900  
hispct 0.0015 0.1700  -0.0018 -0.0900  
asnpct -0.0019 -0.1000  0.0024 0.0500  
ntvpct 0.0045 0.1400  0.1110 1.5100  
fempct -0.0411 -1.0000  -0.0414 -0.4400  
credscr -0.0066 -0.6400  0.0017 0.0700  
income 0.0000 0.1800  0.0001 2.5700 ** 
nonoccpt -0.0054 -1.0300  -0.0246 -2.0500 ** 
nivst -0.0470 -3.7800 *** -0.0839 -2.9600 *** 
spread 0.0130 1.6500  0.0252 1.4100  
pctrefi 0.0201 3.7100 *** 0.0552 4.4700 *** 
lien2nd 0.0028 0.3700  0.0272 1.5500  
pctadj 0.0058 0.6600  0.0181 0.9000  
denpct -0.0025 -0.4600  0.0032 0.2600  
unempl 0.0378 1.6000  -0.0561 -1.0400  
numpermt 0.0007 0.5600  0.0067 2.4900 ** 
hpidx -0.0105 -9.9800 *** -0.0132 -5.5300 *** 
probusvc 0.0012 0.1800  -0.0101 -0.6700  
       
R-sq 0.9928   0.9801   
     *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
 
 
Table 3 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 60-day delinquency rates.  For both models, 
R
2
 exceeds 0.96.  The variables that significantly explain 60-day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime 
loans and exhibit the expected direction of influence are unemployment rate and house price index (economic 
conditions).  Also, income (borrower characteristic) exhibits the expected direction of influence for prime loans.  For 
prime loans, the percent of NIV loans (loan characteristic) and the percent of denials (economic condition) 
significantly explain 60-day delinquency rates.  For subprime loans, the percent of African American borrowers 
(borrower characteristic), percent of non-owner occupied loans, percent of NIV loans, percent of refinance loans 
(loan characteristics), percent denials and number of housing permits issued (economic conditions) significantly 
explain 60-day delinquency rates.  The regression results suggest the following: 
 
 60-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans.  
NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments.  
These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk.  Therefore, the 
regression results seem reasonable. 
 60-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans.  
Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers.  
Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
 For subprime loans, 60-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of African American borrowers 
increases.  This result may signify that African Americans face greater income variation, increasing 
delinquency risk. 
 60-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of refinance loans increases for subprime loans.  This 
relationship may signify that borrowers who are experienced with mortgage payments may choose to stop 
making payments temporarily to smooth consumption.  Therefore, we would expect to see a positive 
relationship between percent of refinance loans and 30-day and 60-day delinquency rates and a negative 
relationship between 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates because foreclosure filings may proceed after 
the third payment is missed.  Our findings are consistent with this expectation. 
 For subprime loans, 60-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of non-owner occupied loans 
increases.  This result may signify that these borrowers view credit impairment that results from skipping 
mortgage payments to be too costly.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  
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 For subprime loans, 60-day delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increase.  This 
result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices.  This is consistent 
with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by 
dramatic declines in house prices.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
 
 
Table 3:  60-day Delinquency Rates 
 Prime, 60 Days  Subprime, 60 Days  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
whpct 0.0037 0.6000  0.0104 0.7500  
blpct 0.0059 1.3800  0.0204 2.1600 ** 
hispct -0.0080 -1.2000  -0.0113 -0.7700  
asnpct -0.0067 -0.4700  0.0079 0.2500  
ntvpct -0.0191 -0.8000  -0.0113 -0.2100  
fempct -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0205 -0.3000  
credscr 0.0014 0.1800  -0.0061 -0.3600  
income 0.0000 -2.8100 *** 0.0000 -0.4000  
nonoccpt -0.0038 -0.9700  -0.0149 -1.7200 * 
nivst -0.0270 -2.9600 *** -0.0694 -3.4100 *** 
spread 0.0065 1.1300  0.0017 0.1300  
pctrefi 0.0000 0.0000  0.0263 2.9500 *** 
lien2nd -0.0075 -1.3300  -0.0084 -0.6700  
pctadj 0.0082 1.2600  0.0132 0.9100  
denpct 0.0086 2.1500 ** 0.0295 3.3100 *** 
unempl 0.0519 2.9900 *** 0.0855 2.2100 ** 
numpermt -0.0005 -0.5400  0.0038 1.9500 * 
hpidx -0.0038 -4.9700 *** -0.0069 -4.0100 *** 
probusvc 0.0024 0.5000  -0.0001 -0.0100  
       
R-sq 0.9624   0.9925   
    *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
 
 
Table 4 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 90-day delinquency rates.  For both models, 
R
2
 exceeds 0.86.  The variable that significantly explains 90-day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime 
loans and exhibits the expected direction of influence is unemployment rate (economic condition).  Also, income 
(borrower characteristic), percent of refinance loans, and percent of adjustable rate mortgages (loan characteristics) 
exhibit the expected direction of influence for prime loans.  House price index (economic condition) exhibits the 
expected direction of influence for subprime loans.  For prime and subprime loans, the percent of denials (economic 
condition) significantly explains 90-day delinquency rates.  For subprime loans, the percent of NIV loans (loan 
characteristic), the percent of Asian American borrowers (borrower characteristic) and the number of building 
permits (economic condition) significantly explain 90-day delinquency rates.  The regression results suggest the 
following: 
 
 90-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans.  
Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers.  
Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
 90-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for subprime loans.  NIV loans are 
primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments.  These loans 
are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk.  Therefore, the regression results 
seem reasonable. 
 For subprime loans, 90-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of Asian American borrowers 
increases.  This result may signify that Asian Americans face greater income variation, increasing 
delinquency risk. 
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 For subprime loans, 90-day delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increase.  This 
result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices.  This is consistent 
with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by 
dramatic declines in house prices.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
 
 
Table 4:  90-day Delinquency Rates 
 Prime, 90 Days  Subprime, 90 Days  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
whpct 0.0094 0.4300  0.0115 0.1700  
blpct 0.0234 1.5600  0.0408 0.9000  
hispct -0.0386 -1.6400  -0.0282 -0.4000  
asnpct -0.0076 -0.1500  0.2624 1.7200 * 
ntvpct -0.1241 -1.4800  0.0448 0.1800  
fempct 0.0581 0.5400  -0.1519 -0.4700  
credscr 0.0013 0.0500  -0.0058 -0.0700  
income -0.0002 -4.3600 *** -0.0001 -0.7700  
nonoccpt -0.0064 -0.4700  -0.0548 -1.3200  
nivst -0.0521 -1.6100  -0.3008 -3.0800 *** 
spread 0.0159 0.7800  0.0486 0.7900  
pctrefi -0.0354 -2.5000 ** 0.0419 0.9800  
lien2nd -0.0271 -1.3500  -0.0535 -0.8800  
pctadj 0.0402 1.7500 * 0.0988 1.4200  
denpct 0.0329 2.3200 ** 0.1373 3.2100 *** 
unempl 0.2760 4.4900 *** 0.5867 3.1600 *** 
numpermt -0.0022 -0.7100  0.0160 1.6800 * 
hpidx -0.0039 -1.4100  -0.0370 -4.4800 *** 
probusvc 0.0072 0.4100  -0.0229 -0.4400  
       
R-sq 0.8631   0.9712   
     *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
 
 
Table 5 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 90+ day delinquency rates.  For both 
models, R
2
 exceeds 0.94.  The variables that significantly explain 90+ day delinquency rates for both prime and 
subprime loans and exhibit the expected direction of influence are unemployment rate, house price index (economic 
conditions), percent of refinance loans, and percent of adjustable rate mortgages (loan characteristics).  Also, income 
(borrower characteristic) and number of building permits (economic condition) exhibit the expected direction of 
influence for prime loans.  For prime and subprime loans, the percent of denials (economic condition), percent of 
NIV loans (loan characteristic), and the percent of Hispanic American borrowers (borrower characteristic) 
significantly explain 90+ day delinquency rates.  For prime loans, the percent of Asian and Native American 
borrowers significantly explain 90+ day delinquency rates.  For subprime loans, the percent of loans with 
subordinate liens (loan characteristic) significantly explains 90+ day delinquency rates.  The regression results 
suggest the following: 
 
 90+ day delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans.  
Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers.  
Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
 90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans.  
NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments.  
These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk.  Therefore, the 
regression results seem reasonable. 
 90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of Hispanic American borrowers increase for prime and 
subprime loans.  This finding may signify that lenders pursue foreclosure more rapidly with these 
borrowers.  Otherwise, these borrowers may attempt to avoid prolonged delinquency because of the credit 
impairment associated with foreclosure.   
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 90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of Asian and Native American borrowers increase for 
prime loans.  This finding may signify that lenders pursue foreclosure more rapidly with these borrowers.  
Otherwise, these borrowers may attempt to avoid prolonged delinquency because of the credit impairment 
associated with foreclosure. 
 90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of loans with subordinate liens increases for subprime 
loans.  This finding may signify that lenders pursue foreclosure more rapidly for these borrowers.   
 
 
Table 5:  90+ Day Delinquency Rates 
 Prime, 90+ Days  Subprime, 90+ Days  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
whpct 0.0081 0.2900  0.0770 0.8200  
blpct 0.0254 1.3600  0.0292 0.4500  
hispct -0.1060 -3.6200 *** -0.3656 -3.6400 *** 
asnpct -0.1442 -2.2900 ** -0.0412 -0.1900  
ntvpct -0.2184 -2.0800 ** -0.1290 -0.3600  
fempct 0.1601 1.2000  0.1634 0.3600  
credscr 0.0160 0.4800  0.0689 0.6000  
income -0.0002 -3.5700 *** 0.0002 0.8900  
nonoccpt 0.0165 0.9700  0.0560 0.9500  
nivst -0.0952 -2.3600 ** -0.6156 -4.4400 *** 
spread 0.0129 0.5100  -0.0182 -0.2100  
pctrefi -0.0598 -3.3900 *** -0.1004 -1.6600 * 
lien2nd -0.0291 -1.1700  -0.1999 -2.3300 ** 
pctadj 0.1144 3.9900 *** 0.4016 4.0900 *** 
denpct 0.0482 2.7300 *** 0.2857 4.7200 *** 
unempl 0.4523 5.9000 *** 1.1648 4.4200 *** 
numpermt -0.0100 -3.4800 *** -0.0200 -1.3700  
hpidx -0.0116 -3.4000 *** -0.0502 -4.2900 *** 
probusvc -0.0051 -0.2400  -0.0176 -0.2400  
       
R-sq 0.9433   0.9801   
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
 
 
Table 6 provides the regression results for all prime and subprime delinquency rates.  For both models, R
2
 
exceeds 0.96.  The variables that significantly explain delinquency rates for both prime and subprime loans and 
exhibit the expected direction of influence are unemployment rate and house price index (economic conditions).   
Also, income (borrower characteristic) exhibits the expected direction of influence for prime loans.  For prime and 
subprime loans, the percent of denials (economic condition) and the percent of NIV loans (loan characteristic) 
significantly explain delinquency rates.  For subprime loans, the percent of Asian borrowers (borrower 
characteristic) and the number of building permits (economic condition) significantly explain delinquency rates.  
The regression results suggest the following: 
 
 delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans.  Increased 
denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers.  Therefore, the 
regression results seem reasonable. 
 delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans.  NIV loans 
are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments.  These 
loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk.  Therefore, the regression 
results seem reasonable. 
 delinquency rates increase as the percent of Asian American borrowers increases for subprime loans.  This 
result may signify that Asian Americans face greater income variation, increasing delinquency risk. 
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 delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increases for subprime loans.  This result may 
signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices.  This is consistent with studies 
which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by dramatic 
declines in house prices.  Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. 
 
 
Table 6:  Delinquency rates (all delinquent loans) 
 Prime Loans Subprime Loans 
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
whpct 0.0038 0.11  0.0115 0.17  
blpct 0.0291 1.29  0.0408 0.90  
hispct -0.0445 -1.26  -0.0282 -0.40  
asnpct -0.0162 -0.21  0.2624 1.72 * 
ntvpct -0.1427 -1.13  0.0448 0.18  
fempct 0.0138 0.09  -0.1519 -0.47  
credscr -0.0097 -0.24  -0.0058 -0.07  
income -0.0002 -3.36 *** -0.0001 -0.77  
nonoccpt -0.0151 -0.73  -0.0548 -1.32  
nivst -0.1224 -2.52 ** -0.3008 -3.08 *** 
spread 0.0335 1.09  0.0486 0.79  
pctrefi -0.0147 -0.69  0.0419 0.98  
lien2nd -0.0294 -0.98  -0.0535 -0.88  
pctadj 0.0523 1.52  0.0988 1.42  
denpct 0.0391 1.84 * 0.1373 3.21 *** 
unempl 0.3758 4.07 *** 0.5867 3.16 *** 
numpermt -0.0020 -0.42  0.0160 1.68 * 
hpidx -0.0179 -4.37 *** -0.0370 -4.48 *** 
probusvc 0.0103 0.40  -0.0229 -0.44  
       
R-sq 0.9668   0.9933   
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
 
 
  Overall, the factors that significantly influence delinquency rates are: 
 
 Borrower characteristics - Income reduces all delinquency rates for prime borrowers, except 30-day 
delinquency rates.  
 Loan characteristics – NIV loans reduce delinquency rates.  ARMs increase 90-day delinquency rates for 
prime loans and 90+ day delinquency rates for prime and subprime loans.  Refinance loans increase 30- and 
60-day delinquency rates and reduce 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates.   
 Economic conditions - Growth in the house price index reduces delinquency rates.  Unemployment and 
denials increase all delinquency rates, except 30-day delinquency rates.   
 
  These results suggest that borrower income, type of loan, and the general health of the economy remain 
important in determining delinquency risk.  Also, factors that determine 30- and 60-day delinquency rates differ 
from those that determine 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates.  Economic conditions such as unemployment rate 
and denials do not affect 30-day delinquency rates.  However, these factors are important in explaining 60-day, 90-
day and 90+ day delinquency rates.  Similarly, refinance loans increase 30- and 60-day delinquency rates and reduce 
90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates.  This suggests that borrowers with experience making mortgage payments 
may temporarily skip payments but will avoid the risk of foreclosure by catching up when the third payment is due.  
Also, factors that determine prime delinquency rates differ from those that determine subprime delinquency rates.  
Income reduces prime loan delinquency rates, except for 30-day delinquencies.  However, income is only significant 
in explaining 30-day delinquency rates for subprime loans and the relationship is positive.  Also, the number of 
building permits increases subprime loan delinquency rates, except for 90+ day delinquencies.  However, the 
number of building permits is only significant in explaining 90+ day delinquency rates for prime loans and the 
relationship is negative.  Finally, borrower race does not consistently explain delinquency rates.  In some cases, 
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borrower race increases delinquency rates and in other cases borrower race reduces delinquency rates.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Obama Administration’s efforts to curve the devastating effects of forced foreclosure have been 
introduced in the President’s Home Affordable Modification “Relief” Plan of March 4, 2009. The Plan addresses 
many issues presented in this paper. For mortgage loans that are in imminent default, loan modifications will be 
used as an effective tool to minimize losses to investors and help borrowers avoid foreclosure. The Plan reduces 
individual mortgage interest rates by as much as 200 basis points, extends the term of many of the mortgages up to 
as many as 40 years and, where possible, allows for forbearance or forgiveness of portions of mortgage principal 
balances to allow some mortgage payments to equal to thirty-one percent of the monthly household income. The 
incentive of the plan is to bring “responsible” homeowners to a current status on their mortgage loans and allow 
them to remain in their homes, to reduce the large number of foreclosures, and to assist homeowners in maintaining 
some remnants of their prior credit standing and avoid delinquencies and foreclosures. 
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